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I. INTRODUCTION
Compensating for harms is the bedrock of the practice of tort law.
The hypothetical ideal of “making the victim whole” guides many a
classroom discussion and judicial opinion. Yet we all know that this
ideal is often unattainable for a variety of practical and conceptual
reasons. Focusing on the conceptual issues, a question might be asked:
Are we ever really able to make the victim whole? Realizing this ideal
requires that the victim be brought to a state of indifference between (1)
having been harmed and subsequently compensated and (2) having
never been harmed in the first place. Obviously, in practice we never
expect to be able to give a potential tort victim such a choice, but this is
* Faculty of Law, Bar Ilan University. Ph.D. 2002 (with highest distinction),
L.L.M. 2001 (summa cum laude), Bar Ilan University; L.L.B. 1997, Tel Aviv University.
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often the benchmark we use in assessing proposed compensation.
Striving for an unattainable ideal is never easy, especially when
dealing with personal harms so prevalent in tort law. Yet one type of
harm stands out as posing even more difficulties: those harms where
moral intuition suggests that no compensation may ever be sufficient to
bring the victim closer to a state of indifference. It is precisely this
stronghold that Robert Cooter aims to conquer with his theory of
compensation for risks rather than harms in his article, Hand Rule
Damages for Incompensable Losses.1
In a nutshell, the problem Cooter addresses is this: With harms that are
by their nature incompensable, even the hypothetical ideal of making the
victim whole breaks down. The problem of incompensability makes any
amount of monetary compensation irrelevant to the basic goal of
bringing the victim to a state of indifference between the actual turn of
events and the hypothetical absence of a tort. While some have suggested
that this makes compensation irrelevant, Cooter correctly stresses that
this would exacerbate the problem rather than mitigate it.2 We are thus
in need of a theoretical ideal to strive for in the case of incompensable
harms, since making the victim whole is impossible in theory as well as
in practice. Cooter’s article aims to fill this gap by shifting the focus
from compensation for the actual harm to compensating for the potential
harm, namely direct compensation for the risk created by potential
tortfeasors.
It must be stressed that Cooter is well aware that his framework may
be inapplicable in full due to practical considerations, yet he defines the
first-best ideal to strive for in the case of incompensable harms. This
contribution to the theoretical literature is thus significant, even if
practical issues preclude full implementation at this point. The article
does an important service, not only in outlining the hypothetical ideal
that may guide future discussions, but also in presenting and developing
the key methodological tools that must be mastered by those who
venture into this difficult arena.
Of course, one need not accept an argument in its entirety in order to
concede its value. In what follows I aim to stress and develop the
aspects of the argument I find most convincing, while critiquing others.
While Cooter is focused on the end result of developing a compensation
theory that circumvents the problem of incompensable harms, most of
my misgivings and suggestions lie with the methodology employed in
the process. I do hope that improving upon the means will enhance the
1. Robert Cooter, Hand Rule Damages for Incompensable Losses, 40 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1097, 1098 (2003).
2. Id. at 1101–02.
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end as well, but I also hope to convince the reader that advances in
method are worthy in and of themselves and that discussion within this
context may lead to application in others as well.
II. ANALYZING INCOMPENSABILITY
Cooter draws an important distinction between harms that are
incompensable in practice and those that are incompensable in
principle.3 Practical considerations preclude full compensation in a
variety of circumstances, such as lack of markets that would allow
objective assessment of the harm caused or replacement of a unique
good. The key problem addressed here, though, is incompensability in
principle—when the harm done is of a nature simply impossible to
compare to any monetary unit. Because our aim to make the victim
whole may be seen as the victim’s hypothetical indifference as described
above, Cooter utilizes the framework of indifference curves prevalent in
the microeconomic literature. This graphic representation is a powerful
tool for overcoming problems that seem to require interpersonal
comparisons of utility, but can actually be solved by relying solely on an
individual’s own utility. Discussion of compensation is especially suited
to this type of analysis, as we refer directly to hypothetical points of
indifference: the first-best aim of compensatory damages. While some
see incommensurability as limiting the application of economic models
in legal and philosophical debate,4 Cooter shows that the indifference
curve methodology may still be judiciously employed. Incommensurability
is thus interpreted as the incomplete ordering of indifference curves,
allowing for flexibility in the point at which the harm becomes
incommensurable with monetary compensation.
The use of indifference curves to graphically convey incommensurability
is carried out in two formats that Cooter presents as similar for our
purposes. In the first, we see that for some values of health, compensation
for loss is possible in principle, while below a certain point we lose
commensurability altogether. Graphically, the indifference curves fail to
cover all of the relevant space. An economist would take such an
argument to state that economics simply cannot inform the discussion of
compensating below the relevant threshold. In the second, however,
3.
4.
(1987).

Id. at 1103, 1109.
See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849
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indifference curves do cover all values of the good measured, only they
are lexical below the threshold and convex above it. Thus, where
preferences are lexical, no amount of money can compensate for any
additional loss of health.
While Cooter presents both formats as signifying incommensurability,
I find an important distinction here is overlooked: Lexical preferences
signify that preferences do exist for all of the relevant space, only that
one good (here, health) is valued infinitely more than the other. In the
first instance of no indifference curves, an economist should profess
humility by recognizing that some human decisions cannot be described
with economic models. In the case of lexical preferences, however, it is
not that the model is inapplicable to the question at hand; it is only that
its results are difficult to analyze. A lack of preferences is not the same
as the existence of lexical preferences, despite both cases’ resistance to
standard monetary compensation for harms caused.
For example, Cooter poses the question: “How much money would
you take for your eye?” as an example of a question which is wrongly
formulated, that the amount of money should never influence the
answer.5 If this is the case of lexical preferences, one must ask what is
so different from a previous example Cooter uses: “I do not know how
much I would accept for a fifteen percent decrease in my visual acuity,
but I could figure it out if faced with the possibility of selling it.”6
Granted, some people may agree that there exists a fundamental
difference between losing one’s eye and a relative decrease in visual
acuity, but is one really commensurable with money, while the other is
incommensurable in principle? If so, and assuming that we are able to
somehow figure out where exactly the fine line between the two cases
lies, is this the case of lexical preferences or of incomplete ordering?
I suggest that there exists a fundamental difference between incomplete
ordering and any type of complete ordering, including partially lexical
preferences. Lexical ordering, as its name implies, grants one of the
goods infinite value with respect to the other. Incomplete ordering is,
as its name implies, well—incomplete. Thus, in the examples of
incommensurability typically posed in philosophical and legal debate,
lexical ordering is implicitly assumed. When asking how the courts can
compensate for the loss of a loved one, or for significant bodily harm,
scholars routinely assume money is of less value than the harm caused,
that is, that preferences are lexical. Incomplete ordering would imply that
we have no opinion regarding the comparison, thus it is not that no amount
of money would compensate for the loss, but that there is a fundamental
5.
6.
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difference between the money and the harm, so that money is simply not
a factor. To stress the point, most people would be offended by the
question, “How much money would you accept for the death of your
child?” not because they do not know how to compare the two, but
because the life of a child is presumably much more valuable than any
amount of money. To say that the ordering is incomplete in this case
would lead us to the result that a person would be unable to formulate
whether he prefers the money or the life of a child.
Contrary to Cooter’s treatment of both types of ordering as similar
forms of incommensurability, I find lexical preferences to be much more
suited to signify the problems encountered in the legal literature of
compensatory damages. From this we can conclude that the economic
model of indifference curves is applicable to the problem at hand, but we
shall need to deal with the difficulties of analyzing lexical preferences.
III. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF RISK AND PROSPECT THEORY
The main problem in using any type of economic model to study
incommensurability is that economics has little to offer if we cannot, at
least theoretically, compute the value of the harm caused. Since the
outset of this discussion, it has been repeatedly stressed that, similarly to
certain other types of harms, life has no monetary equivalent. What is
an economist to do? Cooter utilizes previous studies in order to shift the
focal point not to the harm caused, but to the risk of its occurring. “If we
cannot measure the value of a life,” it might be stated, “can we at least
measure an individual’s subjective assessment of the risk involved?”
Measuring people’s actual expenditures to reduce the risks they face, the
argument goes, allows us to infer the subjective value they associate
with their lives. Now it must be stressed that Cooter is careful to avoid
actually associating monetary expenditures with the value of life as such
and explicitly rejects such an identity. Yet he is able to use these studies
by shifting the discussion as a whole from compensating for loss of life
or limb to compensation for the creation of such risks. We cannot measure
the subjective valuation of human life; indeed our whole discussion of
incommensurability stresses that such a monetary valuation is impossible in
theory as well as in practice. What we can do is measure the monetary
valuation of the reduction in risks, including the risk of suffering
incommensurable harms, and Cooter makes full use of this. It is here
that the crux of the argument lies, and it is here that I shall focus my
critique.
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The study of people’s actual expenditures to reduce the risks they face
is commendable as a measure of their subjective risk valuations. Still,
there is a conceptual problem that must be faced before such an inference
can be made. We are all aware that people suffer from various idiosyncrasies
in their investment decisions. As long as these idiosyncrasies are personal
in nature, we may still use studies evaluating large numbers of such
investments as a good measure of average valuation because personal
eccentricities7 tend to cancel out, leaving us with a statistically unbiased
estimator. However, the problem we need to attend to is that investments
in risk reduction are subject not only to mistakes but also to significant
bias in a manner that taints the average itself. Simply put, there exist
elements affecting most individuals in a certain way, so that these
investments do not reveal their true risk valuation; studying averages of
a large number of such decisions does nothing to correct for these biases.
The types of bias to which I refer have been extensively studied,
beginning with Tversky and Kahneman’s famous “prospect theory.”8
Examples of such behavior are widespread and well-known and include
the difficulty most people have in fully incorporating the existence of
low levels of risk into their behavior, despite the fact that if the risk does
materialize, a significant harm will occur. For example, an individual
maximizing his expected utility should be willing to spend at least an
identical amount to eliminate a 1% risk of a $100,000 loss as he would
to eliminate a 50% risk of a $2000 loss.9 Experimental evidence shows
that this is not the case, as individuals generally see the higher risk level
as more real even when the individual has (and is able to understand)
convincing data that the discounted present value of both risks is
identical.10 Similarly, studies show that following a large and widelyreported earthquake, more people buy homeowner’s insurance, despite
the fact that their objective circumstances have not changed, and the risk
to their property is no greater than it had been before the earthquake.11
The relevant point for Cooter’s article is that we cannot use data on
people’s actual expenditures in order to achieve a true assessment of
7. An economist might refer to these eccentricities as irrational.
8. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 17 (Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
9. Actually, this understates the problem by assuming risk neutrality. Most
economic models assume risk aversion, so the person should be willing to spend much
more to eliminate the low probability risk, given that the expected value of the loss (here,
$1000) is the same.
10. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(2002).
11. See Paul Slovic et al., Rational Actors or Rational Fools: Implications of the
Affect Heuristic for Behavioral Economics, 31 J. SOCIO-ECON. 329 (2002).
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their subjective valuation of the harm they would suffer if the risk
materialized. Monetary investments in risk reduction are subject to
numerous effects, biasing different individuals’ choices in similar
directions. These biases do not cancel out over large samples. To the
contrary, they are reinforced and must be considered when making the
transformation, on which Cooter relies, from the value of risk reduction
to the value of harm avoidance.
It must be stressed that the word “bias” is not to be taken as
derogatory in any way. The problematic nature of such biases is simply
that most people are affected in similar ways. Hence, eccentricities do
not average out over large groups. In order to convincingly use statistical
data regarding risk assessment, we need to address the problems of
psychological bias directly. Cooter thus relies all too readily on the
available statistical data and would do better to incorporate some of the
insights behavioral economics have to offer on topics such as these.
IV. THE HAND RULE AND THE PERFECT INSURANCE MARKET
An important step in Cooter’s argument is in offering a novel method
of employing the well-known Hand rule to solve the incommensurability
problem. While traditionally used for assessing either the reasonableness
of behavior governed by no clear norm or the reasonableness of an
existing norm, Cooter proposes to “turn the rule around” in order to
assess the harm done. I shall not repeat Cooter’s excellent explanation
of the “new” Hand method,12 but instead focus on where I find the
method wanting. Granted, a simple formula is easy to invert. Rather
than multiply the probability of harm (the level of risk) by its “price” (if
materialized) in order to assess the required reasonable level of
investment in care, we can do the opposite: calculate the price of harm
from the known level of risk and actual investment. Cooter does well to
infer subjective value from use of an individual’s own risk reduction
investment to calculate his assessment of the harm. However, practicality
demands that available data on averages be employed in our imperfect
world. Still, a number of points must be made.
First, this is an application of the data referred to above, and the
problem with inherent bias persists. We must remember that the problem
is more than of statistical value. Cooter employs the above econometric
data to get around the incommensurability problems by arguing that
12.

See Cooter, supra note 1, at 1112–15 (explaining the new Hand rule).
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subjective investment in risk reduction shows subjective valuation of the
harm itself: here, harm to life and limb. Thus, if we are to be convinced
by his overall argument that risk valuation can be employed rather than
the impossible valuation of the harms themselves, it is of special
importance that at least the data regarding risks be measured without
inherent statistical bias.
Second, this inverted use of the Hand formula does not come without a
cost. Once we decide that the variable of interest is the level of harm (L in
Hand’s notation), we can no longer use the formula to calculate the original
variable, the burden of care (B in Hand’s notation). In essence, this is the
old problem of “grasping the stick from both ends” bathed in mathematical
jargon. One equation cannot be used to calculate two unknowns.
Thus Cooter’s use of the Hand formula to determine the appropriate
valuation of incommensurable harms necessitates an independent negligence
assessment, which would be a return to the original “reasonable person”
standard unassisted by the Hand rule. This point goes unattended in the
article and may perhaps be defended by a firm belief in judicial insight
and experience regarding negligence determinations and reasonableness,
such that the Hand formula is unnecessary in this respect. Still, as one
accustomed to economic analyses of tort law, it seems to me that this
would be a high price to pay. Cooter’s emphasis that “the reasonable
person . . . does not make mistakes or suffer regret”13 makes it clear that
he still holds on to the hypothetical ideal governing tort law, thus
making it less likely that he would gladly relinquish the formula’s
contribution to judicial consistency and predictability.
Utilization of perfect insurance markets completes Cooter’s treatment and
is presented as a theoretical framework that would solve the problem of
incompensable harms in a first-best world. The move from compensating
for the harms themselves to compensation for risk creation truly is
remarkable as a theoretical insight and holds potential for circumventing
incommensurability altogether. While many share the view that harms of
the nature described are incomparable with money in any way, individuals
do allocate funds to reduce the risks of such harms and make constant
choices as to how much they are willing to spend. Thus, if we can focus on
compensating for risk rather than harm, we have solved both the conceptual
and the practical problem with which we began. The conceptual problem is
solved because the incommensurable harm is not compensated for directly.
The practical problem is solved because risk is, to a certain extent, measurable,
using real data concerning the value people place on risk reduction.
Cooter’s argument for a first-best regime in which risks are directly
compensated for without further compensation when the harm materializes
13.
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is convincing. His utilization of perfect insurance markets implementing
such a regime while allowing for trade is in the best tradition of law and
economic scholarship, achieving a first-best efficiency incentive while
respecting individuals’ rights to form their own subjective value and
satisfy their own preferences perfectly. Of course, we are all well aware
that insurance markets are not perfect, and practical issues preclude
direct implementation of this framework. But that is irrelevant when
dealing with a theoretical construct for a first-best world.
Unfortunately, I still find a basic conceptual flaw in the argument.
The “compensation for risk” framework suggested creates perfect efficiency
incentives, but Cooter aims higher than that. He also strives for fairness
and a solution to the incommensurability problem. In essence, his solution
can be stated as such: We cannot really compensate for these types of
harms, because they are incomparable with money in principle. Let us
then compensate for the risk created, using real world data and subjective
risk valuations, allowing us to create the right incentives while maintaining
the moral position that incommensurability implies with respect to the
harms themselves.
In this move, Cooter implicitly assumes that the risk itself is
compensable, regardless of the harm underlying it. However, are we
convinced that such a fundamental difference exists between risk, as a
probability of some harmful occurrence, and the occurrence itself? Surely,
many find the question “How much money would you accept for the life of
your child?” to be both repugnant and conceptually mistaken. Would those
same people have no misgivings when the question is reframed as “How
much money would you accept to put your child’s life at risk?” If the life is
incommensurable with money in principle, can we safely assume that the
risk for that same life is commensurable? I think not.
True, many people make financial decisions regarding risk to life and
limb, and the amount devoted to risk reduction is a finite sum. Yet this
is not a determinant of the conceptual incommensurability problem.
Similarly, the fact that juries in many jurisdictions do eventually award
wrongful death monetary damages does not imply that life itself is
comparable with money. We do these things because we live in an
imperfect world and many times have no recourse but to make financial
decisions regarding issues that are conceptually incompatible with
money. The econometric analysis referred to above, while extremely
important from a practical point of view, proves nothing in the moral
realm. The move from compensation for harm to compensation for risk,
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while important and insightful, does not solve the incommensurability
problem with which we began.
A related problem can be seen when we assess what it is that people
actually insure for. For example, it has been observed that people are
more likely to buy insurance (or are willing to pay more) for an object
they have affection towards, regardless of pecuniary value.14 While this
seems self-evident, it suggests that insurance is not aimed solely to
mitigate risk in securing an income in the face of some external
monetary loss. Insurance is also often regarded as a form of consolation,
so that the added income gives the insured some feeling of having
received a benefit at a time of emotional distress. Surely some types of
distress would be classified as incompensable in our discussion,
notwithstanding the fact that the victim receives insurance benefits. The
existence of such insurance in no way makes the harm suddenly
compensable. It only implies that people correctly anticipate that some
form of consolation will be needed and settle for what they can
realistically get. Incommensurability is thus not avoided when we deal
with risk rather than harm.
Returning to the preferences analysis above, it might be possible to
interpret Cooter’s position regarding incommensurability of harms as an
incomplete ordering. Thus, people can be said to have no method of
comparing certain types of harms to money, or even to each other.15
Shifting the discussion to the risks involved might allow for a more
complete ordering, based on the argument that risks are inherently more
comparable than harms. Therefore, the indifference curves may cover
more of the relevant space, allowing for traditional analytical methods of
previously unrelenting dilemmas. On the other hand, if one assumes that
incommensurable harms do have associated preferences, only that they
are lexical in nature, the shift towards risk analysis demands that
preferences change from the vertical, or lexical, type to a more standard
convex shape. One must ask why such a change in preferences is to be
assumed. If the risks cannot be disassociated from the underlying
harms, why should we expect preferences to change with this shift? Of
course, Cooter commits to neither of these options, as the point of
incomparable risks is not addressed in his article.

14. Christopher K. Hsee & Howard C. Kunreuther, The Affection Effect in
Insurance Decisions, 20 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141 (2000).
15. The famous dilemma of a parent forced to choose between saving only one of
two children comes to mind. How does one compare the harm in order to make such a
choice?
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V. APPLICATION TO AUTO DEATHS
Cooter applies his analysis to compensation for wrongful deaths in
automobile accidents, arguing that his framework would increase actual
compensation.16 Here especially we should stress the problematic nature
of the econometric data relied upon, applying the lessons of prospect
theory mentioned above. Investment in risk reduction is very sensitive
to the type of risk assessed, and auto death is a notable example of
existing bias. Without going into too much detail at this point, I shall
just point out that the risk of automobile accident death is both highly
publicized—an aspect leading to overinvestment due to the saliency
effect—and a common, everyday occurrence, leading to underinvestment.17
It may be that these biases tend to cancel each other out, but that is a
very strong assumption requiring substantiating research.
More importantly, the conclusions stated rely on the standard economic
assumptions that raising the price of auto insurance would result in
higher care, thus reducing accidents. I find this particularly unconvincing in
the chosen context of automobile accident deaths. While, as a general
argument, increasing price does indeed increase supply, it seems that
driving care is a notable exception. The price people pay for their lack
of care while driving is not monetary, but manifests as an increased risk
of bodily harm. Increasing the monetary cost of driving does little to
alter the overall incentive scheme, given that the nonpecuniary loss is so
large anyway. In economic terms, the supply of care in driving is very
inelastic with respect to monetary returns, and if we aim to change
driving habits, we must seek alternative methods.
Perhaps it is fitting that the problem faced here is precisely of the sort
this discussion aimed at solving to begin with. Raising compensation
for automobile accident deaths, if convinced that such is warranted,
relies on data regarding risk valuation to raise the real price of driving.
My critique above argues that this method is insufficient to circumvent
the incommensurability problem because the risk itself may be incomparable
with money in principle. In the context of automobile accident deaths,
we encounter the application of this same problem. Monetary incentives
are employed in order to change driving behavior, but this behavior has
been chosen by drivers who consciously (one would hope) face risks of
bodily harm. Because these types of harm are incommensurable with
16.
17.

Cooter, supra note 1, at 1114–16.
Cass R. Sunstein, Selective Fatalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 799 (1998).
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money in principle, my critique suggests that the risks involved may be
similarly incommensurable. Thus, looking to monetary incentives as a
behavior altering mechanism may be overly optimistic. To the extent
that money is an insufficient representation of the true value people
attach to the risk of bodily harm, monetary incentives will be imperfect
in achieving the results sought. Employing Cooter’s terminology, if
preferences were lexical to begin with, so that money is not
interchangeable with bodily harm, raising the monetary price of careless
driving adds little, if anything, to the perceived costs of an automobile
accident.
Of course, this is not to imply that money will have no effect on
driving behavior, as biases in risk perception may be constructively
employed as well. It might be argued that raising the price of careless
driving aids in adding to the low accident probability a higher
probability and more immediate payment for insurance. This payment
may induce care due to the saliency effect, thus assisting in our end
result. While helpful in practice, this will not solve our more basic
incommensurability problem. Cooter’s theoretical construct is extremely
helpful in reformulating the issues so as to advance our analysis. Still, it
seems to me that if we wish to fully describe attitudes towards the risk of
bodily harm as well as attitudes towards the harm itself, we must
continue to struggle with incommensurability.
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